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There are only countably many sets
Comme le Dieu des philosophes, l’ope´ration de Hilbert est incompre´hensible et ne se voit pas ;
mais elle gouverne tout, et ses manifestations sensibles e´clatent partout. Godement
We freely use the contents of Bourbaki’s book [1]. In particular
(T |x)R means “T replaces x in R” whenever T is a term, x a letter
and R a relation.
Metatheorem 1 There are only countably many sets. Different sets
can be equal; more precisely, given any set X, there is a list X1, X2,
. . . of pairwise distinct sets all equal toX; in particular any nonemp-
ty set has infinitely many elements.
Metaproof. According to [1] (II.1) the words “set” and “term” are
strictly synonymous. There are only countably many terms. (Some
of these sets are called “uncountable”. Call them “funny” if you
wish. Don’t be afraid of Virginia Woolf!) The terms X,X ∪∅, X ∪
∅ ∪∅, . . . are all different but equal. 
Metatheorem 2 The relation τx(x = x) = τx(x 6= x) is undecid-
able in Bourbaki’s theory T .
Metaproof. Denote τx(x 6= x) by c. For any letter x and any relation
R, define the terms σx(R) and ρx(R) as follows: if R is a theorem
of T , then σx(R) is c, and ρx(R) is τx(x 6= c); otherwise σx(R) and
ρx(R) are τx(R). Let Tσ (resp. Tρ) be the theory obtained from T
by replacing τ by σ (resp. ρ). Since the relation in the Metatheorem
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is true in Tσ but false in Tρ, it suffices to check that all the axioms of
T hold in Tσ and Tρ. Let ε be σ or ρ.
Verification of S7 ([1]I.5.1). Let R and S be relations and x a
letter. We must show
((∀x)(R⇔ S))⇒ (εx(R) = εx(S)). (1)
We can assume that R is a theorem and that S is not. We obtain
successively
• R< S by C15 ([1]I.3.3),
• (∃x)(R< S) by S5 ([1]I.4.2),
• (εx(R) 6= εx(S))⇒ ((∃x)(R< S)) by C9 ([1]I.3.2),
• (1) by C24 ([1]I.3.5).
Verification of the other axioms. In the other axioms the Hilbert
operation does not appear explicitly, but is hidden behind the quan-
tifier ∃, which is defined by letting (∃x)R be (τx(R)|x)R if x is a
letter and R a relation. Define (∃εx)R as (εx(R)|x)R. It is enough to
show (∃εx)R⇔ (∃x)R, that is (εx(R)|x)R⇔ (τx(R)|x)R. We can
assume again that R is a theorem. In this case S5 ([1]I.4.2) implies
that (εx(R)|x)R and (τx(R)|x)R are theorems too, and C9 ([1]I.3.2)
yields the conclusion. 
Say that a machine is an assignment of a finite or infinite se-
quence y = (y1, y2, . . . ) of zeros and ones to each finite sequence
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of zeros and ones. Let 〈0, 1〉 be the set of all
words in 0 and 1, let {0, 1}N be the set of all maps from N to {0, 1},
where N denotes the set of positive integers, and let F be the set of
all maps from 〈0, 1〉 into the union of 〈0, 1〉 and {0, 1}N :
F =
{
f : 〈0, 1〉 → 〈0, 1〉 ∪ {0, 1}N
}
.
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A machine M shall be called a Bourbaki machine if it is given
by a term in the sense of [1], i.e. if there is a term T ∈ F such
that T (x)n and M(x)n are either both defined and equal or both
undefined, whenever x is a finite sequence of zeros and ones, and n
a positive integer.
Metatheorem 3 Any Turing machine is a Bourbaki machine and
vice versa.
Metaproof. See Kleene [2], § 68-69. 
These considerations suggest the following definition of theory
or formal system (we use the two expressions synonymously). For
any set X let 〈X〉 be the free monoid generated by X. Let f :
〈N〉 → N be the bijection sending (n1, . . . , nk) to pn11 . . . pnkk where
pi is the i-th prime, and 〈f〉 : 〈〈N〉〉 → 〈N〉 its functorial extension.
Let R ⊂ 〈N〉 and P ⊂ 〈R〉 be subsets. We think of R as being
the set of relations (or formulas, or statements, or assertions, as you
like best) of the theory, and of P as being the set of proofs. Say that
(R, P ) is a theory if the characteristic functions of f(R) ⊂ N and
f(〈f〉(P )) ⊂ N are Bourbaki machines.
Final remarks
I would be most grateful to anybody who could give me an answer
to the following questions.
• To which extent does the proof of Go¨del’s First Incompleteness
Theorem rely on the considerations below (taken from [2], § 41, p.
195)?
The terms: 0, 0′, 0′′, . . . , which represent the particular natural num-
bers under the interpretation of the system, we call numerals, and we
abbreviate them by the same symbols “0”, “1”, “2”, . . . , respectively,
as we use for natural numbers intuitively (. . . ). Moreover, whenever
we have introduced an italic letter, such as “x”, to designate an in-
tuitive natural number, then the corresponding bold italic letter “x”
3
shall designate the corresponding numeral 0(x), i.e. 0′···′ with x ac-
cents (x ≥ 0) . . .
Let P (x1, . . . , xn) be an intuitive number-theoretic predicate. We say
that P (x1, . . . , xn) is numeralwise expressible in the formal system,
if there is a formula P(x1, . . . , xn) with no free variables other than
the distinct variables x1, . . . , xn such that, for each particular n-tuple
of natural numbers x1, . . . , xn,
(i) if P (x1, . . . , xn) is true, then P(x1, . . . ,xn) is provable, and
(ii) if P (x1, . . . , xn) is false, then “not P(x1, . . . ,xn)” is provable.
• Who would expect any reasonable theory of mathematics to be
complete?
• (Recall that a theory is complete if any relation without letters is
true or false.) Is there a natural reason for making such a discrim-
ination between relations without letters and relations with at least
one letter?
Thank you to Bruno Blind, Fre´de´ric Campana, Jean-Marie Didry
and Frano¸is Marque for their interest.
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